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THE BUDGETARY IMPACT OF DEFENCE 
EXPENDITURES IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
ROBERT E. LOONEY 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
ABSTRACT 
This paper attempts to examine the relationship between defence spending and budgetary 
allocation in twelve Middle Eastern and North African/Mediterranean countries. The impact 
of increases in defence spending on the budget deficit is analysed to find if there is any 
trade-off between spending on defence and other spending categories. The paper also tests 
if budgetary patterns involving defence vm:v by country group. 
1. Introduction 
In the aftermath of the Kuwaiti conflict, there is 
likely to be an increase in defence spending in many 
of the Middle Eastern and North African countries. 
This expansion may occur even though a number of 
these countries face growing fiscal problems and 
pressing social and economic difficulties. Depend-
ing on the relative impact of defence spending, shifts 
in resources may significantly affect the economic 
performance as well as the democratization in these 
countries. 
The purpose of this study is to examine the 
relationship between defence spending and budge-
tary allocations in twelve Middle Eastern and North 
African/Mediterranean countries: Malta, Cyprus, 
Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Israel, 
Bahrain, Iran, Pakistan, and Oman. 1 
In recent years, many of these countries have 
been forced to introduce austerity programs. 
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An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 
International Conference on Business and Ec~nomic 
Development in Middle Eastern and Mediterranean Countries, 
Malta, May 25-27. The author is indebted to Professor M. M. 
Metwally and other conference participants for their 
constructive comments. 
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However despite its importance, little is known about 
how these governments set priorities for their 
shrinking revenues between major expenditure cate-
gories. Do expenditures on certain categories vary 
systematically with unanticipated changes in the 
budgetary deficit? Military expenditures? If so, 
which sectors gained? Lost? Do these patterns 
provide insights as to the manner in which the 
government established budgetary priorities during 
this period? 
Specifically, the study addresses the following 
questions: 
1. Does a causal budgetary trade-off exist between 
defence spending and non-defence categories? If 
so, what are the magnitudes of this trade-off? Is 
the trade-off modified by budgetary conditions-
deficits? 
2. Do the trade-offs vary over time -- are the 
patterns found in the long run significantly 
different from those experienced in the short 
term? 
3. Do the budgetary patterns involving defence 
vary by country group -- countries with high 
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versus low defence burdens (the share of Gross 
National Product devoted to military expen-
ditures)? 
2. Trade-off Literature 
On the surface, budgetary tradeoffs between 
defense and allocations to socio-economic programs 
would seem to be straightforward. That is a given 
budgetary increase in military expenditure will 
crowd out an equivalent amount of all other 
spending, and these programs will be reduced 
according to their proportion of the total. However 
recent research has shown that this view of the 
budgetary process is simplistic and does not conform 
with the manner in which governments often chose 
to prioritize expenditures. 2 
A related issue, and one of significant relevance 
for the many of the Middle Eastern countries facing 
austerity programs is the manner in which austerity-
driven budgetary cuts are allocated. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that officials often follow rather ad 
hoc rules for making large contractions in a short 
time - cutting new rather than ongoing projects, new 
rather than present employment, and materials and 
travel expenses rather than personal; and favoring 
Ministries that are politically powerful, or reducing 
those that expanded most rapidly in the past. 3 
Operationally, several methods have been used 
to establish whether trade-offs exist.4 First, using 
cross-section data it should be possible to discern 
whether relatively big spenders on the military are 
relatively small spenders in areas such as education 
and health (and vice versa). Recently a study by 
Harris, Kelly and Pranowos found: 
2 See for example Saadet Deger, "Human Resources, 
Government Education ExpenditiJre and the Military Burden in 
Less Developed Countries," Journal of Developing Areas 
(October 1985), pp. 37-48. 
3 Cf. the discussion in N. Caiden and A Wildavsky, Planning 
and Budgeting in Poor Countries (New York: Jolm Wiley, 
1974). 
4 The following draws heavily on G. T. Harris, "Economic 
Aspects of Military Expenditures in Developing Countries: A 
Survey Article." Contemporary Southeast Asia (June 1988), 
pp. 95-96. 
5 Goeffrey Harris, Mark Kelly and. Pranowo, "Trade-offs 
Between Defense and Education/Health Expenditures in 
Developing Countries." Journal of Peace Research (1988), 
pp. l-14. 
I. Based on one year's data (1983), countries that 
allocate relatively high proportions of their 
central government expeJ!diture (CGE) to 
defence do not commonly allocate relatively low 
proportions to education and health (and the 
converse applies); 
2. Defence expenditure has a low vulnerability 
during times of overall CGE cuts, but so do 
health and education expenditures. If anything, 
defence is more vulnerable than the other two, 
particularly in low income countries; 
3. During times of CGE expansion, defense expen-
diture in low income countries expands at a rate 
comparable with education and somewhat more 
than health. In middle income countries, health 
expenditures increase more proportionally than 
defence and education; and 
4. For 12 Asian countries between 1967 and 1983, 
multiple regression analysis confirmed that 
trade-offs between defence expenditure and 
education/health were rare. 
Second, and again following Harris, the effect of 
central government expenditure increases or cut-
backs on, say, defence, health, and education 
allocations may be examined. If a trade-off existed, it 
might be expected that defense expenditure would 
gain relative to other expenditure categories during 
years of CGE cutbacks. 
As to the choice of which sectors to cut back, it 
is often felt that some se~tors are more "vulnerable" 
than others. The defence sector, particularly, is 
usually considered difficult to reduce, while social 
sectors, such as health, education and rural develop-
ment, are considered vulnerable. 
In the first comprehensive study of relative 
\ulnerability Hicks and Kubisch examined 37 cases 
of budgetary reduction. These were defined as 
occurring in countries where real expenditure 
declined in one or more years. 
Hicks and Kubisch's main findings indicated 
that the countries examined experienced an average 
decline of 13 percent in real Government expendi-
ture. Associated with this decline was a contraction 
of only five percent in the social sectors (producing a 
vulnerability index of 0.4). By contrast, the index 
was 0.6· for the administrative/defense sectors and 
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over one percent for production and infrastructure. 
In short, the various social sectors were less 
vulnerable to cuts than defence and administration, 
which in turn were considerably less vulnerably than 
production and infrastructure contrary to the 
generally accepted view. 
The fact that social sectors and defense were 
both relatiYely protected suggests that there were 
high political costs associated with reducing them. 
On the other hand, countries appeared to have been 
more willing to cut spending on infrastructure and 
production which, of course, are likely to have 
adverse implications for longer term growth, but few 
early direct and immediate costs. 
Summing up these recent studies, Hicks and 
Kubisch found that when faced with difficult choices 
in reducing public expenditures, governments con-
sider a wide range of factors, including political and 
economic costs, present versus future consumption 
and the potential impact on employment, distribution 
and welfare. Their empirical results suggest that 
when governments in developing countries imple-
ment austerity programs, they do not apply across-
the-board reductions in expenditures. Generally, 
capital expenditures are reduced more than recurrent 
expenditure. Within both capital and current 
budgets, the social and administrative/defence 
sectors appear to be relatively protected, while infra-
structure and production absorb disproportionately 
larger reductions. That social sectors do not appear 
to be highly vulnerable to expenditure reductions in 
times of austerity was the novel finding of that study. 
Subsequent to Hicks and Kubisch's study several 
additional patterns have been identified. Without 
necessarily making a distinction as to current versus 
capital expenditures, these. studies suggest that these 
countries tend to make selective cuts in non-defence 
categories, focusing either on social or economic 
programs. These patterns are further modified by the 
manner in which countries choose to selectively fund 
high priority sectors through running larger fiscal 
deficits. 
This pattern was found to be present in several 
arms producing countries where a fairly close link 
exists between the government budget deficit, public 
consumption and military expenditures. These 
countries show defence expenditures linked to 
_ l ______ _ 
budgetary deficits, i.e., defence expenditures rise 
with government deficits. Other expenditures may be 
cut back during periods of high deficits. With 
surpluses, defense e:x."Penditures, everything else 
equal, tend to decline in percentage terms.6 
Y. The Role of Economic Environment 
While the trade-off literature provides valuable 
insights as to the budgetary decision process, this 
view is incomplete in that it does not systematically 
take into account the overall state of the economy 
and the impact of defence expenditures may have on 
economic growth. 
Logically the willingness of countries to cut or 
expand defense expenditures will also be affected by 
these macro-economic considerations. To gauge the 
differential impact defense expenditures may have 
had on growth in the high and low groups a model of 
the general form: 
GY = f [GI, GYL, MEY, MEGE, MEGEL) 
+ + ? ? ? 
Where: 
GY the rate of GDP growth, 1980-
1989; 
GI the rate of growth in investment, 
1980-89; 
GYL = the rate of growth in GDP 1970-
1979; 
MEGE = the average share of defense 
expenditures in the central 
government budget 1980-1989; 
and 
MEGEL = the average share of defense 
expenditure in the central 
government budget 1972-1979. 
This formulation is based on the normal 
developing country assumption that investment is the 
6 Robert E. Looney, "Military Expenditures in Latin America: 
Patterns of Budgetary Trade-offs" op. cit., p. 101. 
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key element in gronth. 7 It also draws an empirical 
pattern first noted by Nugent " ... for the aggregate 
growth rates of individual countries to be rather 
similar from one decade to the ne>..1. "8 This pattern 
was observed above whereby the high military 
expenditure countries achieved higher rates of 
gro\\1h in both the 1970s and 1980s. 
While a detailed description of the results 
obtained from this analysis is beyond the scope of 
this paper,9 several major findings are of relevance 
for the current study: 
1. Developing countries are far from 
homogeneous with regard to the manner in 
which defence expenditures impact on their 
economies. Countries with high defence 
burdens appear to have an environment that 
while generating higher rates of overall 
growth do so in a manner independent of 
the defence burden. On the other hand there 
is some evidence these countries experience 
negative effects stemming from high budge-
tary shares allocated to the military; and 
2. In contrast countries, with a low defense 
burden tend to experience relatively 
depressed rates of growth. Within this 
group however countries with higher 
defence burdens experience more rapid 
rates of growth. For extreme cases 
(countries with very low defence burdens) 
7 Obviously this is a simplification, but investment has 
traditionally been introduced as the starting point in models of 
this sort. See for example: Riccardo Faini, Patricia Annez and 
Lance Taylor "Defence Spending, Economic Structure. and 
Growth: Evidence Among Countries and Over Time". 
Economic Development and Cultural Change (April 1984), 
pp. 487-498. 
8 Jeffrey Nugent, "Momentum for Development and 
Development Disequilibria" Journal of Economic 
Development(July 1977), p. 35. 
9 A complete presentation can be found in Robert E. Looney 
"The Budgetary Impact of Defence Expenditures in the Middle 
East". Paper presented at the International Conference on 
Business and Economic Development in Middle Eastern and 
Mediterranean Countries, Malta: May 25-27, 1992. Copies of 
this paper are available from the author upon request. 
increased shares of the budget allocated to the 
military are also associated with higher rates of 
growth in Gross Domestic Product. 
The . picture that emerges from these 
comparisons is one whereby the high defence group 
appears more dynamic economically--they have 
greater rates of growth, higher investment and 
savings rates, together with similar debt servicing 
burdens. This is not to say that the high defense 
countries spend more on defence simply because thq' 
can afford this type of allocation. It simply suggests 
that these countries have been able to sustain their 
high rates of economic expansion despite their 
relatively high defence burdens. 
4. Budgetary Trade-offs Time Series Analysis 
While these patterns are clear, their explanation 
is not. It would be easy to argue that military 
expenditures do have a net positive impact on these 
economies (the result from the total sample) and that 
the countries with high defence burdens are simply 
experiencing diminishing returns from this source. 
Similarly, countries with a low defense burden have 
not reached this point of diminishing returns. 
Regarding budgetary shares, these arguments could 
be extended: countries with high proportions of their 
budget allocated to defence may derive some 
stimulative effects in the short run but over time the 
deterioration in economic services and human 
capital offsets any positive stimulus derived from 
expenditures of this type. 
While the defence burden patterns are beyond 
the scope of this paper, 10 it may be possible to shed 
some light on the budgetary effects on growth. 
Returning to our sample of Middle Eastern 
countries, and as starting poin a model similar to 
10 Previous research suggests that countries that are relatively 
unconstrained in terms of foreign exchange and/or 
savings/investment tend to have a net positive impact from 
defence expenditures. Often, however, in resource scarce 
countries this impact becomes negative. The speed of defence 
mobilization may also be very important in this regard with a 
gradual expansion in the defence burden neutral or stimulative 
but a surge in defence expenditures producing negative impacts 
on the economy. See for exan1ple Robert E. Looney "The Role 
of Military Expenditures in Pre-Revolutionary Iran's Economic 
Decline". Iranian Studies (1988), pp. 52-81. 
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that used in a recent analysis11 of Saudi Arabian 
budgetary patterns was estimated: 
SHARE = f [GDEFEX, GDEFUX, MILXU, 
MILXE] 
Where12 • 
GDEFEX = the expected government budgetary 
position (-=deficit, +=surplus); 
GDEFUX = the unexpected government budge-
tary position; 
MILXU = Unexpected defense expenditures; 
and 
MILXE = Expected defense expenditures. 
All the variables are defined in terms of their share 
of government expenditures. 
In this formulation, we assume t_he expected 
deficit reflects a structural imbalance between 
revenue and expenditure. Similarly, transitory 
government deficits are assumed to be depicted by 
that component of the public deficit that was 
unanticipated. Admittedly, this may occur because of 
a revenue shortfall. In those circumstances, however, 
the expected deficit could be attained simply by 
cutting expenditures accordingly. If an unanticipated 
deficit occurs, therefore it is assumed that it reflects 
the decision to fund priority sectors. Similarly, if a 
sector's budgetary share falls with an in£rease in the 
unanticipated deficit, it is assumed that that sector's 
funding was reduced to support other programs of a 
higher priority. 
11 Robert E. Looney "Deducing Budgetary Priorities in Saudi 
Arabia: The Impact of Defence Expenditures on Allocations to 
Socio-Economic Programs". 1'ublic Budgeting and Financial 
Management 9(1992), pp. 311-326. See also Robert E. Looney 
"Budgetary Priorities in Saudi Arabia: The Impact of Relative 
Austerity Measures on Human Capital Formation." OPEC 
Review (Sununer 1991), pp. 133-152. 
12 Expected values were estimated by regressing each year's actual 
figure on that of the previous year. The predicted value for each 
year was assumed to be that expected. Unexpected values were 
calculated as the difference between what actually occurred in a 
given year and that which was expected. See Robert Looney 
"Budgetary Priorities in Saudi Arabia: The Impact of Relative 
Austerity Measures on Human Capital Formation" OPEC 
Review (Sununer 1991), pp. 133-152 for a more detailed 
explanation of this method. 
This form of prioritizing is consistent with 
(although not proof of) some form of lexicographic13 
ordering of budgetary priorities. That is, the 
Government tries to maintain certain budgetary 
categories at pre-defined levels. When these levels 
are met, the authorities are then willing to provide 
additional funding for categories and programs of 
lower priority. The expected and. unexpected military 
expenditure terms can be interpreted in a similar 
manner. 
Two sets of regressions were estimated: The first 
of the form noted above, reflects short run budgetary 
adjustment to changes in the deficit and defense 
expenditures. The second set examines longer term 
budgetary adjustment to year-to year changes in the 
deficit position and military shares. These longer 
term adjustments are assumed to follow a distributed 
lag and thus were estimated by including the lagged 
value of the dependent variable as one of the 
regressors. 14 
Because of space limitations the main findings 
are presented in summary form. 15 Here several 
patterns are clearer if countries are grouped accord-
ing to whether they support high or low levels oJ 
defense expenditures (Tables I and 2). For the shorl 
run (Table 1): 
1. Public services appear to have fairly high 
priority in the high defence group, but nol 
in the low defense group. For all of the high 
defence countries other than Israel increases 
in the expected deficit were used to fund 
exlJanded levels of public services; 
2. Expanded defence shares (particularly un· 
expected increases) also appear to suppor1 
public services in the high defense group; 
13 Cf. J. Encarnacion. "Some Implications of Lexicographi< 
Utility in Development Planning". The Philippine Economi< 
Journal (Second Semester, 1970), pp. 231-240. 
14 First formulated in L. M. Koyc. Distributed Lags an< 
Investment Analysis (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1954). Se• 
M. Nerlove. "Lags in Economic Behavior". Econometric< 
(1972, pp .. 221-251 for the economic interpretation of !hi 
phenomenon. 
15 A complete set of detailed results are available from the autho 
upon request. 
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Table 1 
Patterns of Short-Run Budgetary Impact and Trade-off 
(Nature of impact) 
Country Budgetary Position Defence Expenditures 
Expected Unexpected faq>ected Unexpected 
Public Services-High Defense Countries 
Egypt + + ins + 
Syria + ins ins 
Jordan + + ins + 
Israel ins ins + + 
Pakistan + ins ins ins 
Morocco + + ins 
Public Services-Low Defense Countries 
Iran ins ins ins 
Oman ins ins ins ins 
Malta ins ins 
Tunisia ins ins ins ins 
Cyprus ins ins ins ins 
Bahrain ins ins ins ins 
Education 
Egypt + ins + 
Syria ins + + 
Jordan + + + + 
Morocco ins + 
Israel ins ins ins ins 
Pakistan ins + 
Iran + + ins ins 
Oman ins ins ins ins 
Malta ins ins ins 
Tunisia + + ins 
Cyprus ins ins 
Bahrain ins ins ins 
Health 
Egypt + ins ins 
Syria ins + 
Jordan ins + ins 
Morocco ins ins ins ins 
Israel ins ins ins + 
Pakistan ins + 
Iran ins ins ins 
Oman ins ins 
Malta ins ins 
Tunisia ins ins ins 
Cyprus ins ins ins ins 
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Table 1 (Contd.) 
Patterns of Short-Run Budgetary Impact and Trade-off 
(Nature of impact) 
Budgetary Position Defence Expenditures 
Expected Unexpected Expected Unexpected 
ins ins 
+ ins ins 
+ ins 
ins 
ins + + 
ins ins 
+ ins ins ins 
ins ins ins ins 
ins ins ins ins 
ins 
ins ins ins ins 
ins ins ins ins 
Housing, Community Activities 
Egypt ins + 
Syria + ins 
Morocco + + ins 
Jordan + + ins 
Israel ins ins ins 
Pakistan ins + + 
Iran ins ins 
Oman ins + 
Malta + + ins ins 
Tunisia ins + ins + 





Morocco + ins 
Jordan + ins ins 
Israel + 
Pakistan + ins 
Iran ins ins ins + 
Malta + ins 
Oman + + + + 
Tunisia ins ins + ins 
Cyprus + + ins 
Bahrain ins ins ins + 
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Table 2 
Patterns of Long-Run Budgetary Impact and Trade-off 
(Nature of impact) 
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Table 2 (contd.) 
Patterns of Long-Run Budgetary Impact and Trade-off 
(Nature of impact) 
Country 
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3. In contrast, with the exception of Malta, 
public services in the low defense group are 
not affected one way or another with 
changing deficit and defence shares; 
4. Education presents an interesting contrast 
with the high defence countries usually 
increasing its share along with expansion in 
the expected defence share. On the other 
hand several countries reduce its share 
along with unexpected increases in defence. 
This pattern was also found in the low 
defence countries; 
5. Health expenditures appear to be a major 
casualty of expected deficits in the high 
defense group, although in several cases 
this is offset by increased defence 
expenditures (either expected or unexpect-
ed, but usually not both). While this 
category does not get hurt by budgetary 
strategies in the low defence group, it is an 
area likely to be cut by any increase in 
defence expenditures; 
6. As with health, social security and welfare 
in the high defence group does receive some 
budgetary support from increases in the 
indented deficit. However, this sector 
suffers cuts with increases in the unintended 
deficit. With the exception of Pakistan it is 
also susceptible to lost shares when defence 
increases. 
7. Housing and community activities receive 
considerable budgetary support in both the 
high and low defente countries. This is 
particularly true of unexpected deficits in 
the low defense group. This sector's 
budgetary shares are affected in most 
countries by developments in defense, but 
there are no appreciable differences in 
patterns between the high and low defence 
groups; 
8. Economic services provide some interesting 
contrasts. · In the high defence countries, 
shares to this activity are almost certain to 
be cut with expanded defence expenditures, 
particularly if these expenditures are 
unanticipated. This group of countries also 
reduces allocations to this budgetary 
category when unanticipated deficits 
appear; 
9. Still, several of the high defence countries 
Jordan, Israel and Pakistan increase the 
share of the budget for these activities with 
increases in the budget deficit. However, 
this effect may be offset by developments in 
defence and the existence of unexpected 
deficits; and 
10. In contrast, economic services fare 
considerably better in the low defence 
countries with many of these countries 
supporting expanded economic activities 
with budgetary deficits. In addition, a 
number of countries expanded economic 
services along with military expenditures. 
Roughly the same pattern emerges over 
time (Table 2) with several notable 
exceptions: 
1. Public services benefit over time from 
e>..'J)anded deficits, in several of the high and 
low defence countries. However, their 
expansion with military expenditures 
observed in the short term in high defence 
countries does not appear to carry over into 
the longer term; 
2. The negative impacts on health in the low 
defence group produced by defence 
e>..'J)enditures largely disappear in the longer 
term. They do however still occur with 
increases in defence expenditures in 
Pakistan and several of the low defence 
countries; 
3. Reductions in allocations to social security 
and welfare programs seem to be more 
vulnerable to budgetary cuts sin the high 
defence countries. For these countries, 
increases in the unintended share of defence 
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expenditures, as in the short run, also 
reduce the relative allocations to these 
programs. These programs are also more 
vulnerable over time to increases in 
expected defence expenditures in the low 
defence group; and 
4. Economic services are still quite vulnerable 
to unexpected increases in military 
expenditures in the high defence group. 
However, several of the low defence 
countries no longer expand these allocations 
with increases in the deficit. 
5. Conclusions 
The mam findings of the study are: 
1. Defence budgetary trade-offs In the Third 
World are complex. In part, this simply 
reflects differences in budgetary priorities 
across countries. However, this complexity 
also stems from the fact that increased 
levels of government deficits can offset or 
reinforce the impacts that expanded defence 
expenditures have on other budgetary 
shares; 
2. The above analysis indicated that defence 
socio-economic trade-offs . also vary 
considerably depending on whether the 
country has an environment characterized 
by high or low level of military 
expenditures. This usually occurs in both 
the central government budget and in 
relation to the overall size of the economy; 
3. During the 1980s, defence expenditures in 
these two environments also had a 
differential impact on economic growth. In 
the high defence expenditure countries, 
increases in the share of resources allocated 
to defence did not provide any appreciable 
positive stimulus to the economy. For these 
countries, increases in defence in the central 
government budget actually tended to 
reduce the overall rate of growth. In the low 
defence countries, however, increases in the 
I 
defence burden did provide a positive 
stimulus to economic growth. Furthermore, 
increases in the share of defence in the 
central government budget did not retard 
that growth. 
.; 
4. At least in the Middle East, there is a 
partial explanation for these patterns. For 
these countries (with several exceptions) the 
high defence countries appear to cut 
economic expenditures to free up resources 
for further expansions in the military. This 
may occur because of the political costs in 
cutting non-defence expenditure, parti-
cularly over long periods of time. Again, 
with several exceptions, the low defence 
countries seem to have more flexibility on 
accommodating increased levels of military 
expenditure. Perhaps as a result, economic 
programs are not as susceptible to cuts in 
these economies. 
5. Most likely there are long run costs 
associated with the manner in which 
Middle Eastern countries alter budgetary 
shares to accommodate increased military 
expenditures. For high defence countries as 
a whole, increased budgetary shares 
allocated to defence in the 1970s had a 
positive impact on growth in the 1980s. 
Increased budgetary shares to defence in the 
1980s however impacted negatively. Given 
the observed lagged nature of many of 
negative impacts in these countries on 
economic services, this may indicate the 
neglect of economic services, infrastructure 
and the like. If that is the case this group of 
country's high defence burdens are starting 
to take a heavy toll on economic growth. If 
these lagged impacts are stable, we can 
expect growth in these economies in the 
1990s will expand at rates somewhat below 
their long run growth paths. For these 
countries, a reorientation of budgetary 
priorities may not provide an immediate 
stimulus to their economies. 
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